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They come here all the time to check on our school and give us a grade and all that, but 
they never come in to see what we need.  You come into a school and you don’t see a 
library?  Then put one there.  It’s common sense.  If there’s a gym missing, put one in 
there. Don’t just say, “Close the whole school.” 
 
- Student attending a closed school 
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ABOUT UYC  
 
Who we are 
 
The Urban Youth Collaborative (UYC) is a student-led coalition that unites low-income students of color 
from across New York City to create more equitable and effective public schools. We are committed to 
building a strong youth voice that can ensure our high schools are respectful to students, prepare students 
to be successful in college, earn a living wage, and work for justice in society. UYC has emerged as an 
important grassroots voice for improving the city’s high school graduation rates and transforming what is 
too often the punitive culture inside struggling high schools. 
 
 
Why we are organizing 
 
As the “consumers” of public education, youth are uniquely situated to raise forceful demands for the 
resources and accountability that are critical to the success of educational reform.  Because youth have 
direct experience with schooling problems, they bring important insights about reform strategies. Yet 
without an organized base of power such as UYC, students’ perspectives rarely inform reform 
discussions.  
 
 
What we have won 
 
• Student Success Centers (SSCs): SSCs are an innovative model of college access that train high 
school students to work with their peers to complete the college application process, from 
choosing a college to completing applications and understanding financial aid. The three SSCs 
that UYC won have helped hundreds of students apply to a wide range of colleges, access more 
scholarships, and secure more state/federal aid for college.  
• Fighting school budget cuts: Along with allies, UYC has worked hard to reverse and minimize 
state- and city-level cuts to schools.  Through this work, UYC has ensured that the voices of low-
income students of color—those most affected by these policies—are a part of the fight for 
educational equity.  
• Safety with Dignity: Along with allies, UYC worked with the NY City Council to pass 
legislation in December 2011 that will require the NYC Department of Education (DOE) and 
NYPD to report on student safety polices in NYC schools, including student suspensions, arrests 
and expulsion, broken down by race, age, gender, special education status, and English Language 
Learner status. 
• Free transportation for students: UYC led the campaign that saved free and reduced-price 
metro cards for 600,000 students. 
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Member organizations 
 
• Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM) is a multi-generational organization of low-income 
South Asian immigrants in NYC. YouthPower! has led a range of campaigns around immigrant 
students’ rights. 
• Future of Tomorrow of the Cypress Hills Local Development Corporation (FOT) was 
founded in 2005, and organizes students at the Franklin K. Lane campus for school reform.  In 
less than three years, FOT has won a Success Center, led a successful campaign to have the 
school's cafeteria redesigned, and inserted and legitimized youth voice on the Lane campus.   
• Make the Road New York (MRNY) has been organizing students in Brooklyn and Queens, and, 
among other things, has won a Success Center for the Bushwick Campus High School and has 
created a small, autonomous high school with a social justice theme.  MRNY's Youth Power 
Project has organized thousands of students in support of the DREAM Act and has worked with a 
number of schools to implement non-punitive approaches to safety. 
• Sistas and Brothas United of the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (SBU) 
brings together students in the Kingsbridge neighborhood of the Bronx, and has secured 
improvements in school safety policies, facility repairs, and has successfully inserted student 
voice at several local high schools. SBU also worked to create a small high school, the 
Leadership Institute, which also houses a Student Success Center. 
• Youth on the Move: Launched in 2004, YOM has developed relationships with and draws its 
membership from six schools.  YOM has worked with Mothers on the Move to create green jobs 
in the South Bronx, and close down a juvenile detention center in the neighborhood. 
 
The Community Organizing & Engagement Program of the Annenberg Institute for School Reform 
has played a significant role in helping to build the field of education organizing in New York City 
through intensive support provided to community groups including data analysis, research on educational 
reform, leadership training, and strategy development.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Mayor Bloomberg’s Department of Education (DOE) has focused its systemic school improvement 
efforts on one key strategy -- closing poorly performing high schools. The DOE has privileged school 
closure as its primary school improvement policy, as opposed to major initiatives to transform struggling 
schools from within. If this policy continues, more than 65,000 students – more students than the entire 
Boston public school system – will have had their high school experience marked by school closure. 
Because the DOE has a responsibility to ensure that those students do not become policy casualties, it 
must invest as much effort in ensuring a rich, rigorous, college-preparatory education for students in the 
final years of a closing high school as in developing and nurturing the new small schools they continue to 
create. 
 
This report examines what happened to students in the 21 schools that have completed their phase-out 
since 2000, when the DOE announced the first school closings, and predicts the destructive impact that 
school closings may have on students in the high schools that may be at risk of closing next. 
 
The students who attended the 21 closed high schools, almost all of whom are Black and Latino, had 
significantly higher needs and were much more academically under-prepared than the students across the 
city’s high school system. 
 
• 74% were eligible for free lunch, compared to 55% citywide 
• 21% of students were English Language Learners, compared to 13% citywide 
• 46% were overage for grade, compared to 29% citywide 
• 89% were below grade level in ELA and 91% below grade level in math – compared to 67% and 
70% respectively, citywide 
 
Predictably, the academic outcomes of these 21 schools in their final years before closure were also much 
worse. A much lower percent of the students in the 21 schools graduated, a much higher percent dropped 
out, and a sharply higher rate were discharged. At some schools, discharge and dropout rates skyrocketed 
in the final years of phase-out: 
 
• At Taft High School, the dropout rate spiked from 25% the year closure was announced to 70% 
the year that the school closed 
• At Morris High School, the discharge rate rose from 33% the year closure was announced to 55% 
the year that the school closed 
 
Given that some 33,000 students attended the 21 high schools in their final years, the absolute numbers 
behind the percentages are quite startling:   
 
• 5,612 dropped out, 
• 8,089 were still enrolled,  
• 9,668 were discharged,  
• Only 9,592 actually graduated.  
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Moreover, indications are that only 15% of the graduates in the closing schools received a Regents 
diploma, compared to 41% citywide. Similar outcomes can be predicted for students at the schools 
currently at risk of closing unless the DOE changes policy and invests in ensuring a high quality 
education for those students.  
 
Instead of intervening aggressively to help the lowest performing schools improve, the DOE has 
consistently neglected to provide the comprehensive guidance and supports that struggling schools need. 
Reports from the NY State Education Department (SED) on 17 schools identified by the state as 
Persistently Low Achieving (PLA) found that at least 14 of the schools were not provided the assistance 
from the DOE necessary to raise student achievement. Furthermore, SED reviews of the 11 schools 
currently implementing the federal transformation model found that the DOE had largely not met their 
commitment to guide and support the school transformation plans.     
 
The destructive policy of school closings now threatens two additional groups of the city’s high schools: 
14 high schools that the Panel for Educational Policy recently voted to close, and 24 PLA high schools. 
To improve the prospects of poor and working class students of color entering high school academically 
under-prepared, the Urban Youth Collaborative proposes that the DOE suspend its high school closing 
policy and instead implement a set of comprehensive interventions to improve the schools: 
 
1. Invest in struggling schools instead of closing them 
 
• Create a central High School Improvement Zone that brings together struggling and closing 
schools to help them assess and meet the needs of students 
• Create a set of interventions that are put into action when a school is at risk of closure 
• Ensure that all schools have the resources and capacity to meet the needs of ELLs, students 
with special needs, and overage students that are assigned to them 
 
2. Build meaningful partnerships with students and community 
 
• Create stakeholder committees at struggling and phasing out schools that include parents, 
students, teachers, administrators and community organizations to assess the school’s 
strengths and weaknesses, identifying and creating plans for improvement, and hiring staff 
 
3. Provide an engaging and rigorous college preparatory curriculum 
 
• Emphasize and integrate literacy and math skill development across courses in ninth grade  
• Offer a wide range of subjects instead of just those assessed by high-stakes tests 
• Provide access to hands-on, high-level and college credit-bearing courses    
• Support teachers through ongoing professional development and mentoring 
• Create advisories and summer academies for incoming ninth graders  
 
4. Support students in accessing college 
 
• Implement early college preparation and orientation programs   
• Hire one college counselor per every 100 students in struggling schools 
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• Create an early warning system that immediately identifies students who are struggling and 
off-track for graduation or college, and triggers interventions to help 
 
5. Ensure a safe & respectful school climate 
 
• Create supportive school environments that utilize non-punitive approaches to safety and get 
at the root of problems, such as Restorative Justice or Positive Behavior Interventions and 
Supports 
 
No student should be abandoned as a casualty of school reform policy. High school students from low-
income communities of color across the city call on the DOE to launch an aggressive effort to provide 
these supports to all struggling schools, as a step towards the common goal of guaranteeing a college and 
career-ready education for all students.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
For the past ten years, Mayor Bloomberg’s Department of Education (DOE) has focused its systemic 
school improvement efforts on a key strategy -- closing poorly performing high schools. Citing evidence 
of superior academic performance in the new small schools, the DOE has argued that systemic 
improvement depends on closing large, failing high schools and creating large numbers of new, small 
high schools to replace them.1 This strategy has privileged school closure as the primary school 
improvement policy, as opposed to any major initiative to transform struggling schools from within. 
 
Critics have consistently challenged the DOE’s school closing policy and have argued that: 
 
• Most of the students who would have attended the closed high schools were not admitted to the 
small schools that replaced them. Instead, most of these students were enrolled in other large 
comprehensive high schools, which consequently became academically overwhelmed, making 
them additional targets for closure.2  
• High schools targeted for closure were set up to fail by being assigned high percentages of 
students who were overage for grade and whose skills were significantly below proficiency 
levels. High schools targeted for closure were also assigned large percentages of Special 
Education and English Language Learner (ELL) students as well as “over the counter” students 
(those not assigned to any high school by the start of the school year). These large high schools 
were also consistently starved, by the DOE, of the resources necessary to meet the needs of their 
challenged students.3  
• The metrics the DOE uses to identify the supposedly failing high schools are far too limited and 
one-dimensional and, in some cases, produce flawed and inaccurate readings of school 
performance.4  
• Closing high schools is not a viable strategy for comprehensive systemic improvement when the 
system has 213 high schools in which less than half the student population graduates with a 
Regents diploma, and hundreds of elementary and middle schools in which the majority of 
students do not meet state academic standards.5 
 
Though the school closings have generated an escalating level of citywide anger and protest, the DOE has 
intensified its implementation of the policy. Since 2000, the DOE has closed 34 high schools6 – most of 
them under Mayor Bloomberg. Some 14 additional high schools were recently approved for closure by 
the mayor’s Panel for Educational Policy (PEP).  Moreover, since the New York State Education 
Department (NYSED) has identified 32 high schools as persistently lowest-achieving (PLA) schools 
under federal School Improvement Grant (SIG) regulations, some additional sub-set of these high schools 
will likely be targeted for closure by the DOE as well. 
 
If the current school closings policy continues, more than 65,000 students’ high school experience will be 
marked by school closure.7  The DOE has a responsibility to ensure that those students – as well as the 
tens of thousands of students in phasing out elementary and middle schools – do not become policy 
casualties.  The DOE should invest as much effort in ensuring a rich, rigorous, college-preparatory 
education for students in the final years of a closing high school as they do in developing and nurturing 
the new small schools they continue to create. But thus far the DOE has not developed an aggressive 
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strategy to ensure an effective high school education for those 65,000 students. As Shael Polakow-
Suransky, the DOE’s Chief Academic Officer, has indicated:  
 
... there’s not been consistent sets of supports for the schools that are phasing out as part of the 
process of creating new schools. There’s an obligation to the kids and to the adults in those 
schools to provide thoughtful consistent support and communications, so that people know what 
to expect and know what is going to happen from year to year as the school changes and gets 
smaller, and to actually create opportunities for those that want to stay and be part of moving the 
kids that remain to graduation … for them to actually have really strong leadership and real 
resources to do that.8  
  
This report focuses on 21 high schools that have been phased out and closed by June 2009 and have 
reported full student outcome data.9 We examine what happened to students in those 21 schools during 
the four-year phase-out process that began in 2000, when the DOE announced the first school closings. 
By examining the demographics and academic outcomes of the students in the 21 closed high schools, 
this report demonstrates the enormous disruption and loss of students during the school closure process. 
The report argues that extending this loss to the populations of the 14 high schools newly targeted for 
closing and the PLA schools is too costly to the students involved. It proposes, instead, a comprehensive 
set of recommendations, developed by the Urban Youth Collaborative and grounded in their experience 
of the city’s high schools, to improve the performance of those 14 high schools as well as the PLA high 
schools 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF STUDENTS IN CLOSED SCHOOLS 
 
We begin by comparing aggregated student demographics, over four years of phase-out, for the 21 high 
schools closed between 2000-2009, to the aggregated demographics of the entire New York City high 
school population across that same ten-year time period.10 
 
TABLE 1 
Student Demographics in 21 Closed High Schools (2000-09)11 
 
  Closed High Schools (%)  NYC high schools (%)  
Black 48 34 
Latino 47 36 
White 1 15 
Asian 4 14 
Free lunch eligible 74 55 
English language learners 21 13 
Special education 8 6 
 
Sources:  Board of Education, City of New York, 2000-06 Annual School Report Cards.  NYSED, Information and Reporting Services, 
New York State School Report Cards for the 2007-09 school years.   
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The aggregate student demographics for the 21 high schools closed between 2000-2009 presents a stark 
contrast to the demographics of the high schools citywide. The population of the 21 closed schools, 
averaged across their final four years, was 48% Black, 47% Latino, 4% Asian and 1% White – much 
larger Black and Latino populations, and much smaller White and Asian populations than in the city high 
schools.  Across their final four years, a much higher percentage of students in the 21 closed schools – 
74% -- were eligible for free lunch.12  A higher percentage of these students were assigned to Special 
Education (8%), and a higher proportion were English Language Learners (21%), compared to the city 
high schools.  As the graph below demonstrates, three years prior to closure (which is the last year that 
closing schools accepted students, and the first year of their phase-out), a higher proportion of entering 9th 
and 10th graders in the 21 closed schools were overage for grade, one of the key predictors for school 
failure – 46% compared to 29% citywide. In terms of academic readiness, much higher proportions of 
new entering 9th and 10th graders at the closed schools were below grade level in ELA and Math, another 
predictor of school failure, compared to the city’s high schools  – 89% compared to 67%, and 91% 
compared to 70% respectively.   
 
The student needs at some of the schools in the 
year that their closure was announced are even 
more extreme: 
 
• At Seward Park High School, 45% of 
students were English Language Learners, 
compared to 13% citywide 
• At Morris High School, 15% of students 
were in special education, compared to 6% 
citywide 
• At Evander Childs High School, 56% of 
students were overage for grade, compared to 
32% citywide 
• At Taft High School 96% of incoming 
students were below grade level in ELA and 
95% were below grade level in Math, compared 
to 70% and 71% respectively citywide 
 
These comparisons dramatize the instructional 
challenge faced by the 21 closed high schools. 
In every demographic category, those 21 
schools enrolled students significantly more 
disadvantaged and academically under-prepared 
than the students across the city’s high school system during the same time period. Given these 
disparities, one might have expected the DOE to implement policies, supports and interventions to 
improve student outcomes. The Parthenon report, for example, prepared for the DOE by a Boston-based 
consulting firm, demonstrated that in many of the city’s high schools, large student size and 
concentrations of below-proficient students combined to predict very low student graduation rates.14 
Although almost all the 21 closed high schools’ student populations exhibited these at-risk indicators for 
FIGURE 1 
Academically Unprepared and Overage Students in  
21 Closed High Schools, Year Closure Announced13 
 
 
Source:  Board of Education, City of New York, 2000-06  
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years prior to being closed and were therefore predicted, by Parthenon’s findings, to fail to effectively 
educate large numbers of their students, the DOE did little to alter these at-risk factors. The DOE never 
attempted, for example, to cap the concentration of low-proficiency students at large high schools, as the 
Parthenon report recommended.  Instead, they allowed the conditions for failure to continue at many high 
schools, and when schools performed as Parthenon’s analysis predicted, the DOE targeted them for 
closure. 
 
 
WHAT HAPPENED TO STUDENTS IN CLOSED SCHOOLS? 
 
We all started to lose teachers. One day I would have a teacher, and maybe the next day she was 
gone. I had a sub for like three months, because my teacher had left to another school that was 
already inside the school. You could tell that the teachers that stayed were worried because some of 
them didn’t want to be transferred out. Do you know how hard it was to find a recommendation letter 
for college, because I didn’t have a teacher? I was emailing them but I couldn’t find anyone because 
the teachers left.15 
- Students attending a closing school 
 
These 21 high schools had abysmal academic outcomes for years before they were announced for closure, 
as shown in the graph below.16  
 
During the four years of phase-out, 
school performance often 
deteriorates as school cultures 
fragment. The problems that 
produced poor performance are 
often exacerbated when closure is 
announced; school spirit and morale 
plummet, staff scramble for jobs at 
other schools, enrichment and 
afterschool programs move 
elsewhere, and schools become 
physically marginalized in their own 
buildings.   
In the aggregate of the 21 closed 
high schools, across their four years 
of closing, only 43% of their 
students graduated, 25% dropped 
out, and 32% were still enrolled. 
Across the entire city high school 
system between 2000 and 2009, a 
much higher average of 57% of 
students graduated, a much lower 
rate of 16% dropped out, and 26% 
FIGURE 2  
Student Outcomes in 21 Closed High Schools,  
Prior to Closure Announced17  
 
Source:  NYC DOE, Graduation and Dropout Reports, NYC Traditional Graduation  
Rate Archive. 4-Year Longitudinal Reports and Event Dropout Rates for Classes  
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were still enrolled after four years. Moreover, in the 21 schools a much larger group of students in their 
respective cohorts -- 30% -- were discharged, compared to 19% citywide, a very significant disparity.18   
 
These aggregate outcomes 
mask considerable, and 
potentially troubling, year-to-
year variations. Both 
graduation and dropout rates, 
for example, rise quite 
significantly (14% and 6%) in 
the final year of the schools’ 
close-out processes, as the 
following graph demonstrates. 
A 14-percentage point one-
year rise in graduation rates is 
quite unusual. The DOE has 
celebrated this rise as evidence 
of an increase in school quality 
in the final years, but the rise 
more likely indicates that 
possibly problematic strategies 
may have been employed 
during the 21 schools’ final 
year, to qualify so many 
additional students for 
graduation.20  
 
Similarly, the 6-percentage point rise in the dropout rate across those 21 schools, in a citywide context in 
which high school dropout rates have been trending steadily downward, suggests the possibility that 
significantly more students in these closing high schools may have been pushed out. This would not be 
surprising given the enormous pressures on closing schools to empty the school before it shuts down. 
Unfortunately the available data do not allow an examination that would specify causes.  Moreover, 
although a large percentage of students are defined as still enrolled when their schools close, there is no 
publicly available data on what happened to these students, and whether they became dropouts as well, 
once their schools closed. 
 
Finally, the discharge and dropout rates for several of the closed high schools increased very significantly 
in the schools’ final year. Across the school system, discharge and dropout rates seldom vary by more 
than a few percentage points from year to year. Yet as the following graph indicates, a sub-set of the 
closed high schools had enormous increases in their discharge and dropout rates in the final year of their 
school’s phase-out process. This sharp increase means that a very large number of the students in these 
schools abandoned their education or were eliminated from the schools’ rolls. Such large increases 
suggest a policy or practice of pushing students out in these schools’ final years.  
 
FIGURE 3 
Student Outcomes in 21 Closed High Schools, 2000-0919 
 
 
Source:  NYC DOE, Graduation and Dropout Reports, NYC Traditional Graduation Rate  
Archive.  4-Year Longitudinal Reports and Event Dropout Rates for Classes 2000 to 2009. 
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FIGURE 4 
Student Outcomes in 21 High Schools during Four Years of Phase-Out 
 
 
 
Source: NYC DOE, Graduation and Dropout Reports, NYC Traditional Graduation Rate Archive. 
4-Year Longitudinal Reports and Event Dropout Rates for Classes 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Increases in Dropout and Discharge Rates21 at Closed High Schools 
 
 
Source:  NYC DOE, Graduation and Dropout Reports, NYC Traditional Graduation Rate Archive. 
4-Year Longitudinal Reports and Event Dropout Rates for Classes 2000 to 2009. 
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These findings suggest several possibilities: 
 
• Did the graduation rates in these 21 closed high schools’ last year increase because the schools 
managed to help many more students succeed only in that final year? 
• Did the graduation rates increase because these closing schools sought to improve their final 
outcomes through increased use of credit recovery programs and flexible scoring on the Regents 
exams, as suggested in recent reports?22  
• Did the graduation rates increase because significantly more students were classified as dropouts 
and discharges?  
• Do the spikes in both dropouts and discharges indicate a policy of purging students unlikely to 
graduate? 
• What happened to the significant percentage of students categorized as still enrolled after the 21 
schools closed?  
 
The relationship of the discharge rate to the graduation and dropout rates raises the troubling issue of the 
misuse of the discharge category across the city’s high schools.  According to NYSED guidelines, 
students can be discharged from school rolls only if they have been withdrawn from their high school and 
have officially enrolled (which requires documentation) in a private or parochial school, a public school 
outside NYC, a full-time authorized GED program, are over 21 years of age, or have died. In all other 
cases in which students leave their high school, they must be classified as dropouts. Because a dropout 
classification increases a school’s dropout rate and reduces its graduation rate, high schools are often 
tempted to misuse the discharge classification, since discharges remove students from schools’ rolls and 
do not negatively affect schools’ performance or accountability.23  
In January 2003, Advocates for Children of New York (AFC) filed a lawsuit against Franklin K. Lane 
High School24 for discharging difficult-to-educate and older students. The suit charged that these practices 
falsely and illegally raised Lane’s graduation rate and lowered the school’s dropout rate by removing 
overage and difficult-to- educate students from the high school’s rolls.  
The DOE quickly agreed to notify approximately 5,000 former Lane students who had been discharged or 
transferred from Lane that they had a right to return to school and to stay until they turned 21. As a 
consequence, hundreds of students were offered the opportunity to re-enroll. In fall 2003, AFC filed 
similar lawsuits against two additional high schools, and under the settlement agreements, discharged 
students were permitted to re-enroll.  The DOE also developed procedures to ensure that students would 
not be illegally pushed out of school and would be informed of their right to stay in school until the age of 
21. 
But the use of the discharge classification by the city’s high schools has not been reduced; instead, it has 
risen. A comprehensive report by Jennifer Jennings and Leonie Haimson, High School Discharges 
Revisited: Trends in New York City’s Discharge Rates, 2000-2007, released in April, 2009,25 found that 
the school system’s discharge rate had increased from 18% for the Class of 2000 to 21% for the Class of 
2007.  Moreover, a very recently released audit report by the New York State Comptroller’s Office26 
examined the NYC school system’s discharge records for its 2004-2008 general education cohort (the 
group of students who entered ninth grade in 2004 and were expected to graduate four years later). The 
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audit found that in a random sample of 500 discharged students, the DOE incorrectly classified 74 
students (15%) as discharged when those students should have been classified as dropouts.  When the 
Comptroller’s audit corrected for this almost 15% misuse of the discharge classification, the audit reduced 
the DOE’s cohort graduation rate by at least two- percentage points, and increased the DOE’s dropout 
rate by approximately three- percentage points.  
Thus the actual loss of students, and the resulting harm inflicted on them, is likely to be considerably 
higher than our data indicate. Because we used only publicly available data, we were unable to estimate 
the number of students who transferred out of the 21 closing schools and struggled to achieve their 
diploma in new and unfamiliar academic settings. 
 
If you didn’t have all the credits you needed, you would get pushed out.  They told you, you know, 
you have to go to this school.  They would give you options of schools to go to, but it was just the 
thought of being pushed out because you can’t provide the credits that we should be able to take.  
And if you’re a student and other schools are coming in and you hear you can’t take these classes 
anymore and it doesn’t look like you’re going to be able to graduate, on time, and you have to go 
to this other school, you reject it. 
- Student attending a closing school   
Moreover, we have not increased the dropout rate in the 21 closed schools to reflect the 15% misuse of 
discharges, which the Comptroller’s audit documented. Finally, because of data limitations, we could not 
analyze what happened to the very significant percentage of students discharged from the 21 closed 
schools, or the significant increase in students classified as still enrolled, to determine whether those 
students’ high school careers were permanently terminated.   
 
 
IMPACT ON STUDENTS IN SPECIAL PROGRAMS 
 
As previously indicated, the percentages of students enrolled in Special Education and ELL programs in 
the 21 closed high schools were much higher than across the high school system. In the 21 schools’ final 
years, students in these programs suffered severe disruption of the education provisions they are 
guaranteed, by law and DOE policy, to receive.  
 
A 2009 report by Advocates for Children of New York and the Asian-American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, for example, examined the closing of two large Brooklyn high schools, Lafayette High 
School in Bensonhurst and Tilden High School in East Flatbush.27  The report found that, before the 
closing began, Tilden and Lafayette had a substantial number of ELL students, students with special 
needs, and overage and under-credited students. The ELL students who remained in the schools after the 
phasing-out process started received less support and fewer services and, in some cases, were pushed into 
GED classes. But most of the small schools that were created in Tilden and Lafayette accepted very few, 
if any, ELL students, or failed to provide those they accepted with legally mandated ELL programming. 
The closing of Tilden and Lafayette in 2010 resulted in the loss of two large and diverse bilingual 
education programs, including a unique program for Haitian-Creole students. No bilingual programs were 
created in the new small schools placed on those campuses. Moreover, as Tilden and Lafayette began to 
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phase-out, ELL enrollment in surrounding large high schools rose, which may have put those schools at 
greater risk of being closed. 
 
Sharp fluctuations in student demographics and outcomes in specific schools among the 21 closed high 
schools suggest that a variety of limiting scenarios were imposed on these schools’ special programs as 
closure approached. Sudden or large changes in schools’ demographics often cause a distressing level of 
disruption of those schools’ special programs. 
 
The left side of the graph below shows significant increases in the students classified as English 
Language Learners (ELLs) in three high schools during those schools’ closing year. Since it is unlikely 
that those schools would have admitted large numbers of new ELL students in their final years, these 
significant increases in the ELL population suggest that other student populations had significantly 
decreased, and that the ELL students were not getting the supports they needed to graduate. The right side 
of the graph shows large decreases in the ELL population in another sub-set of schools, which could 
indicate that the ELL students were being transferred to more effective schools, or that they were 
dropping out or pushed out in large numbers.  
 
 
FIGURE 6 
Fluctuations in English Language Learners at Closed High Schools 
 
Sources:  Board of Education, City of New York, 2000-06 Annual School Report Cards  
NYSED, Information and Reporting Services, New York State School Report Cards for the 2007-09 school years. 
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THE ABANDONMENT OF STUDENTS LEFT IN CLOSING 
SCHOOLS 
 
Sometimes our schedules will be really off.  They’ll give us a math class freshman and sophomore 
year, then you won’t have a math class your junior and senior year.  Last time I had a math class 
was sophomore year.  And I don’t think I’m ready to be taking college work. I haven’t had social 
studies since sophomore year. 
- Student attending a closing school   
 
All these student outcome disparities illustrate the impact of leaving students in closing schools without 
an aggressive strategy to support them through to graduation. Given that some 33,000 students were 
enrolled in the 21 high schools in their final years, the absolute numbers behind the percentages are quite 
startling.28 
 
• 5,612 dropped out29     
• 8,089 were still enrolled 
• 9,668 were discharged  
• Only 9,592, the assumed success of the phasing-out process, actually graduated.  
Worse, a very low percentage of those 9,592 graduates achieved a Regents diploma, which used to 
represent the minimum standard for predicting college success.  At the four closed high schools that 
reported Regents graduation data,30 only 15% of the cohort achieved a Regents diploma during their four-
year phase-out. Yet across the city school system in those years, 41% of the student cohort achieved a 
Regents diploma. 
 
Experts on the nature of the skills acquisition necessary for success in college have long argued that 
current Regents diploma requirements are insufficient indicators of successful preparation. The New York 
State Regents have recently redefined their College- and Career-Ready state standard -- a student score of 
at least 80 on the Math Regents, and at least 75 on the English Regents, is now the new minimum 
requirement.  Only 23% of NYC’s high school students reached those standards in 2009, and only 13% of 
Black students and 13% of Latino students.  Given these numbers, we can assume that an extremely small 
number of the students who achieved Regents diplomas at the closed high schools reached the college-
level standards established by the Regents. 
 
The dismal statistics raise a critical question: once the DOE defined those 21 high schools as failing, 
should it not have invested in a major effort to improve student outcomes in the schools’ final years?  The 
DOE knew that without significant intervention, the 21 schools slated for closing would continue to fail to 
effectively educate most of their students.  A concerted DOE strategy to provide effective interventions, 
leadership and necessary resources might have improved outcomes for many of the 21 schools’ 
vulnerable students.  Instead, school system inaction has meant that tens of thousands of students in the 
closing schools have become casualties of the DOE’s systemic reform agenda, which has sacrificed the 
education of these students to the projected gains of students in the new small schools created to replace 
them. The cost of this strategy is too high to continue. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOLS AT RISK OF CLOSING  
 
If you were on track with the credits you needed—if you already had everything—you could stay.  
But if you were behind by a good amount, a big amount, then you were eventually pushed out.   I 
know people that transferred and they didn’t do well.  They went to John Addams and they didn’t 
do very well.  Everywhere you go is phasing out.  
- Students attending a closing school   
 
On the 14 high schools slated to close 
 
In February 2011, the Mayor’s Panel on Educational Policy voted to close 14 additional high schools, and 
begin their phase-out processes in September 2011. As the following table indicates, the demographics of 
these 14 high schools are similar to the demographics of the 21 closed high schools in terms of 
race/ethnicity, and free lunch eligibility. But the 14 closing schools have a much higher percentage of 
Special Education students and a lower percentage of English Language Learners.  
 
 
TABLE 2 
Student Demographics in Closed High Schools and Schools Targeted for Closure (%)31 
 
  14 high schools slated for closure (2009) 
21 closed high schools 
(2000-09) 
NYC high schools 
(2009) 
Black 45 48 32 
Latino 46 47 39 
White 3 1 13 
Asian 5 4 16 
Free lunch eligible 70 74 52 
English language learners 15 21 11 
Special education 18 8 12 
 
Sources: Board of Education, City of New York, 2000-06 Annual School Report Cards.  NYSED, Information and Reporting Services, 
New York State School Report Cards for the 2007-09 school years.New York City DOE, CEP School Demographics and Accountability 
Snapshots. 
 
 
Some of the 14 schools newly targeted for closure have even higher percentages of high-needs students:32  
 
• At Paul Robeson High School, 16% of entering students are overage for their grade, compared to 
4% for the city.  
• At John F. Kennedy High School, 22% of students are English Language Learners, compared to 
11% citywide.  
• At Performance Consortium High School, 20% of students are in special education, compared to 
12% citywide 
• At New Day High School, 86% of students are eligible for free lunch, compared to 52% citywide. 
20 
 
The four-year graduation rate in these schools is 43%, compared to 59% for high schools citywide, a 16-
percentage point gap. However, their six-year graduation rate, 59% compared to 66% for the city high 
school system, significantly narrows that gap.  (Four of the schools newly targeted for closure have six-
year graduation rates that equal or surpass the citywide average).33 This more favorable six-year 
graduation rate suggests that, given the high needs and academic unpreparedness of their student 
populations, this group of 14 schools needs more time to prepare students for graduation, and could 
ultimately prove more successful with comprehensive, coordinated improvement efforts.34 
 
Since the 14 high schools newly targeted for closure have student demographics roughly similar to the 21 
closed high schools (except for their higher rate of Special Education students), phasing out those 14 high 
schools may well replicate the scale of student loss seen in the 21 closed schools, unless there is a change 
in DOE policy.   
 
On the 24 Persistently Lowest-Achieving high schools 
 
This school lacks a lot of resources.  We don’t have a gym, a library, an auditorium.  Stuff like 
that doesn’t attract students or make for a good learning environment.  We had a creative writing 
class and there would be more than 30 students—the whole senior class in one classroom, sitting 
on desks, leaning against the radiators -- there was no space to sit, literally. I am a senior now 
and I can’t keep my basketball jersey because we can’t afford it because we’re that broke.   
- Students attending a PLA school 
 
The recent availability of significant federal funding for low-performing schools provides the DOE with a 
new opportunity to improve struggling schools without the trauma of school closings. In the past two 
years, the New York State Education Department (SED) has put 55 schools on the list of Persistently 
Lowest-Achieving schools (PLA), making them eligible for up to $2 million of federal funds every year 
for three years to implement one of four federal restructuring options – restart, closure, transformation, or 
turnaround.35 Currently, there are 43 NYC schools on the PLA list, 32 of which are high schools, as well 
as 11 schools currently implementing the turnaround option. Eight of these 32 schools are slated to be 
closed, leaving the DOE to choose a fate for 24 remaining high schools before SED’s April 30th deadline. 
 
To project the impact on students if the DOE deploys the closure option in some of these current PLA 
schools, we analyze the demographics, level of academic preparedness and outcomes of the students in 
the 24 remaining PLA high schools. First, we compare the demographics in the 24 PLA high schools to 
high schools citywide in 2009. 
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TABLE 3 
Student Demographics in 24 PLA Schools (2009)36 
 
  PLA schools (%) NYC high schools (%) 
Black 33 32 
Latino 47 39 
White 7 13 
Asian 13 16 
Special education 15 12 
English language learners 16 11 
Free lunch eligible 67 52 
Overage students in entering class 8 4 
Average 8th grade proficiency for entering class 2.73 2.94 
 
Sources: Ethnicity -- NYSED, Information and Reporting Services, New York State School Report Cards for the 2009 school year. Special 
education, ELL, Free lunch, Overage -- NYC DOE, CEP School Demographics and Accountability Snapshot 2009. 8th grade proficiency -
- NYC DOE, detailed Progress Reports. 
 
 
While PLA high schools and city high schools overall serve similar proportions of Black students (33% 
and 32% respectively), PLA schools have a higher proportion of Latino students (47% compared to 39%), 
more ELLs (16% compared to 13%), and lower proportions of White and Asian students. PLA high 
schools also serve a higher percentage of students who are eligible for free lunch compared to the city 
(67% to 58%). 
 
PLA high schools have twice as many overage students in their entering classes, compared to NYC high 
schools – 8% to 4% respectively. This discrepancy remains even when the four transfer schools in the 
group, which are designed to serve overage students (7% of PLA schools vs. 4% citywide), are excluded. 
PLA high schools also serve a higher proportion of students receiving special education services 
compared to city high schools – 15% to 12% respectively.  The entering class of students in PLA high 
schools is also less academically prepared, in terms of average eighth grade proficiency levels, than NYC 
high school students as a whole. The demographics in some PLA high schools show more extreme 
disparities: 
 
• At Lehman High School, the number of homeless students increased from 1% (22 students) in 
2006 to 7% (288 students) in 2008 
• At Fordham Leadership Academy, the number of homeless students increased from 1% (6 
students) in 2006 to 15% (78 students) in 2008 
• At Washington Irving High School, 26% of students are English Language Learners, compared to 
11% citywide 
• At Bushwick Community High School, 67% of entering 9th and 10th graders are overage for their 
grade, compared to 4% citywide 
• At Samuel Gompers High School, 23% of students are in special education, compared to 12% 
citywide 
• At Richmond Hill High School, 87% of students are eligible for free lunch, compared to 52% 
citywide  
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In terms of outcomes, the rates for four-year graduation are significantly lower across the PLA high 
schools than in high schools citywide – 45% compared to 59% citywide.37 While a lower proportion of 
PLA students drop out – 19% versus 25% for the city, a higher proportion of PLA students are still 
enrolled after four years – 30% compared to just 12% for city high schools.  Only 29% of students in PLA 
schools graduate with a Regents Diploma, compared to 45% citywide. However, the PLA schools’ six-
year graduation rate significantly narrows the gap with the citywide average – 59% compared to 66% 
citywide.   
 
These data 
demonstrate that 
the PLA schools 
serve more 
disadvantaged and 
academically 
under-prepared 
students than the 
school system as a 
whole, and 
produce, for the 
most part, lower 
academic 
outcomes. Yet, 
similar to the 14 
schools slated for 
closing, the PLA 
schools show 
much better 
graduation 
outcomes in six 
years than four 
years, which 
suggests that, with 
a longer time-span 
to meet their students’ needs, these schools perhaps can be successful. This buttresses the argument for 
intervening to improve the PLA high schools rather than allowing them to close and sacrificing the 
students within them.    
    
Moreover, demographic and monitoring evidence suggests that the struggles faced by the 24 PLA schools 
may be, at least in part, because they have not received the systemic supports they need to improve. First, 
many of the 24 PLA schools are overcrowded, especially when their higher need student populations are 
considered. Half of the PLA high schools operated at more than 100% organizational capacity in 2009.  
 
Second, assessment reviews of 17 of the PLA high schools, carried out by the New York State Education 
Department’s (NYSED) Joint Intervention Team (JIT), found that at least 14 of them were not provided 
FIGURE 7 
Student Outcomes in 24 PLA High Schools, 2009 
 
Sources: 4-year rates -- NYC DOE, Graduation and Dropout Reports, Cohorts of 2001 through 2005  
(Classes of 2005 through 2009) Graduation Outcomes (NYS graduation rate calculation method).  6  
year rate for schools  -- NYSED, Information and Reporting Services, Public School Total Cohort  
Graduation Rate and Enrollment Outcome Summary - 2008-09 School Year All Students.  6 year rate  
for city -- NYSED, Information and Reporting Services, Commissioners Data Presentation, 2005 Cohort  
Graduation Rates Summary - PowerPoint. 
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the assistance and support from the DOE necessary to respond to their improvement needs.  The JIT 
review teams – comprised of a representative from NYSED, a representative from the DOE, an outside 
educational expert such as a retired principal or superintendent, and specialists in areas in which low-
performing schools are traditionally challenged -  cited three consistent problems across many of these 
schools: 
 
1. A lack of concerted, comprehensive efforts by the DOE and each school’s respective network to 
prioritize the school and take action to raise student outcomes,  
2. A lack of support, from the DOE and each school’s respective network, targeted to the areas in 
which each school needed most help, and  
3. A lack of support from the DOE and each school’s respective network for monitoring and 
implementation of each school’s Comprehensive Educational Plan.   
 
The following excerpts from the JIT reports indicate the nature of the problems the review teams found:38  
 
• There is no evidence that the district/Network has supported school improvement efforts (John 
Dewey High School). 
• The Network Team has not adequately assessed school needs and, therefore, has not provided 
critical support (Maxwell High School). 
• School leadership has received minimal guidance and support from the Network (Monroe 
Academy). 
• The team found no evidence of a concentrated and coordinated effort by the district/Network to 
support the improvement of student performance in ELA, mathematics or graduation rates 
(Metropolitan Corporate Academy). 
• The Network has not provided support in the areas the school has identified as priorities, i.e., 
writing and differentiated instruction (John Adams HS). 
 
Specifically, the JIT review for Norman Thomas High School (NTHS) notes: 
 
Development of a strong, working relationship with the District seems to be imperative for the 
success of NTHS. Services to the school that would provide a clear sense of direction and 
prioritization of student needs would be key in moving toward student success….A school facing 
the challenges that NTHS faces cannot “go it alone” but must turn to the District for critical 
support and nurturing while on its road to improvement. 
 
Across the PLA schools, the JIT review teams recommended much stronger support from the DOE and 
each schools’ respective networks, to improve student outcomes. 
NYSED teams made similar recommendations in their reviews of the 11 PLA schools currently 
implementing the transformation model.39 In particular, NYSED found that the DOE had not met their 
commitment to provide expert staff to guide and support the school transformation plans, and that, for 
example:   
 
• Areas of the model that are not being implemented are in relation to the services the district is to 
provide to the school (Chelsea Career and Tech HS) 
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• The implementation of the improvement plan is sporadic at best, with positions left unfilled, and 
funds drawn back to the district level…with no explanation to the school. Timelines have been 
ignored (Brooklyn Global Studies) 
• The district has not incorporated all of the recommendations its own review team put forth. Most 
notably, two turnaround teachers, a school improvement manager, and a district-wide response to 
intervention (RTI) model have not been provided to the school (Franklin D. Roosevelt HS) 
• School leaders at Long Island City HS were not aware that a school improvement manager (SIM) 
would be hired to guide and inform the school during its transformation period (Long Island City 
HS) 
 
The SED teams clearly document the necessity of coordinated, comprehensive central supports to 
improve struggling schools, a need well-documented by research.40 These reviews suggest that such 
supports would go a long way towards generating significant improvements in student outcomes.  
 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE DOE’S SCHOOL CLOSING POLICY 
 
Have consideration!  When they announce [the school closing] to students you have only a year 
before it actually happens so you just have a little time to come up with a plan.  Tell the students, 
and maybe the students can come up with other ideas, some sort of panel so students can get their 
ideas across and represent the other students.  If you are the Chancellor and her staff coming up 
with what to do with the school and you don’t have any students, what does that look like?  
Students know schools better than anyone else. Incorporate them! 
- Student attending a closing school   
 
To improve the prospects of low-income students of color entering high school academically under-
prepared, the Urban Youth Collaborative proposes that the DOE suspend its high school closing policy 
and instead invest in improving those schools, by implementing the following interventions for the 14 
high schools slated for phase-out as well as the 24 PLA high schools.  
 
1. Invest in struggling schools instead of closing them 
 
• Create a central High School Improvement Zone to that brings together struggling and 
closing schools to help them assess and meet the needs of students, and gives them the strong 
supports they need 
• Create a set of interventions that kick in when a school is at risk of closure, including strong 
supports for the school leader, hands-on assistance with implementing recommendations of 
state review teams, and access to expertise in areas of weakness 
• Place teams of expert principals and teachers in the highest needs schools 
• Use six-year graduation rates as the evaluation standard for schools with large numbers of 
students entering below grade level 
• Take measures to draw talented, experienced and committed educators to these schools 
including alternative assessment systems for principals and network leaders and create strong 
supports for individuals in taking on these challenges 
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• Ensure that all schools have the resources and capacity to meet the needs of ELLs, students 
with special needs, and overage students that are assigned to them 
• Create a fair and transparent method for rating Transfer Schools as part of the PLA process, 
since these are not traditional high schools and should not be judged by the same criteria 
 
2. Build meaningful partnerships with students and community 
 
• Create stakeholder committees at struggling and phasing out schools that include parents, 
students, teachers, administrators and community organizations in assessing the school’s 
strengths and weaknesses, identifying and creating plans for improvement, and hiring staff 
• Create a central stakeholder committee to guide and monitor implementation of the High 
School Improvement Zone citywide 
 
3. Provide an engaging and rigorous college preparatory curriculum 
 
• Emphasize and integrate literacy and math skill development across courses in 9th grade  
• Offer a wide range of subjects that engage students in topics that are relevant to their lives, 
histories, cultural backgrounds and aspirations (e.g., music, art, social science, sports, instead 
of just those assessed by high-stakes tests)  
• Provide access to hands-on, high-level and college credit-bearing courses    
• Support teachers through ongoing professional development and mentoring 
• Create advisories and summer academies for incoming 9th graders  
 
4. Support students in accessing college 
 
• Implement early college preparation programs such as college orientation courses, summer 
transition programs and Student Success Centers that train youth leaders to counsel their 
peers about college access 
• Hire at least one college counselor per every 100 students in struggling schools 
• Create an early warning system that immediately identifies students who are struggling and 
off-track for graduation or college, and implement aggressive interventions to help 
 
5. Ensure a safe and respectful school climate 
 
• Create supportive school environments by utilizing non-punitive approaches to safety that 
get at the root of problems, such as Restorative Justice or Positive Behavior Interventions 
and Supports 
 
A comprehensive, coordinated initiative to provide these supports to struggling schools could usher in a 
new era in the NYC public school system, an era in which struggling schools are given the best possible 
chance to succeed, not set up to fail; no student is abandoned in the name of education innovation; and 
students, parents, teachers, community members and the DOE work in genuine collaboration to guarantee 
a college and career-ready education for every student. 
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